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sian emerging markets, while coming out of defiantly anti-market traditions,
have increasingly embraced policies of competitive advantage as crucial to
vibrant economic growth. In the post-communist economies of China and
Kazakhstan, local economies have contributed to sustainable yet diversified
growth in an era where the future recurrence of economic crisis, both in emerging and
mature markets, is uncertain. Emerging markets, like developed economies in the West,
have turned to inter-regional competition, spurred on by local economies and businessindustrial clusters, as internal growth engines to power up national economies. Whether
generated from bottom-up commercial growth or top-led government growth, postcommand economies of Asia, despite their semi-authoritarian bent, advocate inter- and
intra-regional competition. Local economic growth is seen as a means of contributing to
overall economic diversification and creating technical, business, and knowledge
spillover. Yet promotion of diversified regional economies also poses challenges for
Asian state capitalisms that prize state interventionism over commercial solutions.
Transitional economies, such as China and Kazakhstan, aim to activate and sustain
nationwide growth by supporting competition within and between multiple industries
and regions. Yet these Asian state capitalisms are exceedingly wary of implicit lines of
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fragmentation that may come to the fore as regions and sectors compete with one
another for prominence, access to government subsidies, and, most importantly, foreign
investment. The political and economic risk of uneven development, as regions jockey
for power and position, may compromise overall national stability and fracture into
competing factionalisms, particularly if economic growth becomes constrained. Still,
for these Asian emerging markets, creating and sustaining dynamic centers of regional
innovation and industry is seen as key to achieving diversified national growth and
leveling the playing field of long-term economic development.
China and Kazakhstan: Emerging Market Neighbors
In the first decade of the 21st century, the post-communist emerging markets of
Kazakhstan and China defied expectations and anti-market origins by generating strong
GDP growth. While China’s economy has been slowing in 2012, its projected growth
scenarios have earlier clocked in at the high single digits. In 2001, Kazakhstan’s GDP
galloped into the double digits at 13.5%. After dipping down later in the decade, the
country’s economic growth still exhibited a respectable upward growth scenario, over
7% in 2010 and 2011, countering trends in faltering Western economies.
In addition to growth stories that defy an anti-market past, the neighboring emerging
markets of China and Kazakhstan also share other characteristics. Both states continue
to incorporate legacies of a Marxist-Leninism past in their economic present, if with
different institutional implications. The shared Eurasian borders of the two states span a
contiguous landmass rich in subsurface wealth: natural and mineral resources that
support oil, gas, and metallurgy industries.
The two Asian emerging markets also share state-building legacies that predated
communism, legacies that grew out of the necessity of controlling and administering
large territorial expanses of agricultural land along their respective frontiers. As early
the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE - 24 AD), China penetrated into Central Asia and
Eurasian territory. Kazakhstan’s statehood emerged out of the expansion of the Russian
and later Soviet empire into Siberia and central Asia. The sheer scope and variety of
both China’s and Kazakhstan’s territories and sub-regions presents both challenges and
possibilities for future state integration scenarios.
Creating Competitive Advantage: Local Economies and Business-Industrial
Clusters in China and Kazakhstan
Despite the divide between dirigiste East and non-interventionist West, the model of
boosting competition within and between local economies has gained followers on both
sides of the statist vs. free market divide. Emerging markets and mature economies
alike have turned to regional economic development, in particular the development of
business-industrial clusters, as a means to energize state growth. In the Competitive
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Advantage of Nations (1998), Michael Porter of Harvard Business School famously
proposed the creation of multiple commercial clusters as a means to enhance overall
national growth. The economics of agglomeration, discussed by Paul Krugman (1991)
and Alfred Marshall in the 19th century, looked to centers of business-industrial
concentration as a means to generate further growth and enhance competitive
performance and spillover. In this model, as sub-regional economies differentiate, they
branch out into networks of influence that, in turn, generate additional nerve-centers of
economic activity.
In the last few decades, both Western and Asian capitalisms have institutionalized
business-industrial clusters, whether organic growth centers or special economic zones,
as a means to engage local and national economic development in tandem. Whether
adopted by agro-zone, industrial park, or inner city enclave, complementary businessand-distribution networks ideally create spillovers that amplify productivity in
neighboring regions. As original clusters mature, they may become launching pads for
derivative clusters outside of immediate geographic networks.
The business-industry clusters inaugurated by young Asian capitalisms such as
Kazakhstan and China aim to tap into the dynamics of competitive overflow, while
creating new competencies. However, these emerging Asian economies also try to
reign in fragmentation that may arise from potentially contradictory trends exposed by
local economies, to compromise overall state integration. Contradictory impulses of
localized growth, with regions competing among themselves, may generate new
opportunities for overall development. But regional differences, exposing emerging
asset and wealth gaps, may also set in motion social and economic disequilibrium that
both states seek to contain. The risk remains that the periphery may become polarized,
if disjunctures between competing commercial-industrial centers are unresolved, and if
regional inequalities create lines of division rather than spillover-effect. China and
Kazakhstan both contend with such challenges as they attempt to launch growth centers
in their own regional peripheries in particular.
Frontier Markets Join the Emerging Marketplace
As emerging markets such as China become more closely aligned with global market
trends, new players have emerged as new kids on the block. These peripheral states are
not yet global forces to be contended with. Yet they, and their disparate brethren across
Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, present global markets with a new
cast of characters, along with new growth and investment opportunity, in a global
economy where the fate of mature markets is uncertain. Meanwhile, emerging market
countries such as China are now sufficiently high-stakes players in the global economy
that they exceed the limitations of the term “emerging market”. According to Jim
O’Neill, Head of Global Asset Management at Goldman Sachs and originator of the
term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), “emerging markets” are perhaps more
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accurately deemed “growing markets”. Given that China, for one, vies with the US and
Europe in its ability to impact trends and contours of the global marketplace, the impact
of its economic decision-making reaches far beyond national borders: “The world is
new, and the countries driving it are not ones of past generations.”
As emerging markets mature, global finance -- ever in search of new opportunities for
capital creation -- seeks out new sources of investment, growth, speculation, and hedge
opportunity. Frontier markets, considered by many global investors to be a subset of
emerging markets, combine relative openness and relative degrees of political stability
with greater growth opportunity than “classic” emerging markets, albeit with the
downside of greater risk. As young states in Asia and elsewhere enter the high-profile
stakes of the global economy, they have offer investment alternatives to global financial
markets weary of the uncertain returns of domestic “exotic instruments” (namely
mortgage CDOs, which famously turned toxic in 2008). For those intrepid investors
seeking to diversify options for financial gain, the frontier markets, Kazakhstan among
them, offer uniquely diversified opportunities for market exposure. As BlackRock’s
website puts it, these markets provide “a logical extension to the global equity
universe.” In addition to low correlations between mature and immature markets, these
“locally driven economies also offer opportunities for early-stage investment in fastgrowing economies,” opportunities rare in maturing markets: US, European, and,
increasingly, China. However, the frontier markets themselves naturally seek to
manage their own financial and economic destinies apart from the role that Western
investors would have them play.
Regionalism in Kazakhstan and Business-Industrial Clusters
Kazakhstan’s relative isolation from global markets shielded it from the Asian financial
crisis of 1997-8, and this reminds the government that integrating into the global
economy on the terms of the mature markets is not invariably an advantage. From its
own vantage point, Kazakhstan wants to avoid the domination of any one set of global
economic arbiters defining the terms on which it enters the global economic stage.
Eager to abandon the stigma of frontier status, Kazakhstan’s government seeks to define
itself not as an outlier or laggard, but as epicenter of Eurasia. While Kazakhstan
ultimately seeks influence and, inevitably, integration into the larger schema of global
capital markets, the state’s priority is to grow a stable real economy from the inside out,
while reversing its former frontier status at the edge of Russia.
Despite Kazakhstan government’s desire to position itself as epicenter of Eurasia, its
economic geography as landlocked state impedes this development. In addition, a
crumbling heavy industrial infrastructure, inherited from the Soviet era, demands costly
reinvestment across expansive territory. In the past, fragmented logistics were built to
bifurcate Kazakhstan’s productive landscape: during the Soviet Union, western
Kazakhstan’s crude oil transport systems were connected to Russia, so as to be
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processed across the border. Meanwhile, energy supplies in eastern Kazakhstan had
depended on Russian inflow. Eastern and western Kazakhstan, geographically disparate,
became further disconnected by design.
Northern Kazakhstan (with the industrial centers of Pavlodar and Karaganda) is
contiguous with the territorial-industrial-logistics zone of southern Siberian Russia.
Industrial supply chains, as well as informal inter-governmental and business relations,
continue to connect northern Kazakhstan closely to its northern neighbor. By contrast,
southern Kazakhstan, with its desert-zones interspersed by oasis towns, has been closely
affiliated with southern central Asian economies such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in
terms of irrigation-based agriculture and hydroelectric systems. To the far west of state,
adjacent to the Caspian, lies the most precious resource of all, oil – a third of a continent
away from the more populous centers of eastern Kazakhstan. To the far southeast stands
the former capital of Almaty (former Verney, later Alma-Ata), originally established as
a Russian frontier post. Almaty was positioned at the end of the line of a long series of
garrison towns that mapped out the expansion of Russian empire into southern Siberia
and central Asia, acting as a zone of containment and control to mark out agrarian
settlement and constrain nomadic territory. Such a fragmentary landscape, which
reinforces internal geographic disparities, continues to challenge the logistics of the
state, which impede evenly developed economic growth.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan’s government looked to the success
stories of East Asia on which to pattern economic and business development and trade.
The state moniker “Snow Leopard” was chosen by the government to join the
formidable line-up of the successful “Asian tigers”. Unlike the East Asian economies,
however, Kazakhstan was bound by land-locked limitations without access to the
Pacific trade routes that defined export-led growth of the East Asian success story.
Kazakhstan business and government leaders admired the East Asian developmental
states, with their close relationships between large corporate conglomerates -- Korea
with its chaebol and early Japan in its kereitsu stage. Singapore, embracing semiauthoritarian government along with a successful sovereign wealth fund, served as an
important model for strong state control coupled with commercial success.
In order not to be defined by the limitations of a commodity-extraction state,
Kazakhstan’s government has sought to create multiple sources of revenue from
diversified external and internal sources. It aimed to bypass the boom and bust cycles
of a resource-dependent state (resource curse or “Dutch disease”) by accessing multiple
channels of revenue generation. In the early 2000s, Kazakhstan’s government planned
to launch business-industrial clusters as a means to create competitive local economies,
industries, and sectors.
To focus on regional economies as potentially disparate sources of foreign investment
revenue beyond the booming oil-gas sector, in the late 1990s and early 2000s
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Kazakhstan’s state investment bureau published marketing materials explicating the
resources and industries of multiple regions of Kazakhstan: from phosphates to
pharmaceuticals, gold to grain, construction to chemicals. While the unpredictable
markets for oil and gas might create intermittent risk for Kazakhstan’s future,
investment in multiple industries and regions would harbor more stable sources of
security through economic diversification.
In efforts to strengthen and further diversify regional economies, in 2005 the
government of Kazakhstan invited Michael Porter, business strategy expert of Harvard
Business School’s Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, to advise on the creation
of business-industrial clusters. Along with the consultancy J.E. Austin, the Kazakhstan
cluster-project proposed initial templates for broadening and deepening economic
diversity through multiple growth clusters. In twelve regions, Kazakhstan’s
government and business planners, along with advisors, selected 55,000 enterprises for
study. Seven sectors were identified as best prepared to support commercial and
industrial cluster growth: food-processing, textile manufacture, transportation logistics,
tourism, metallurgy, construction materials, and last not least, oil-and-gas machine
building. By 2012, in later policy iterations, other industries were added as emerging
priorities: biotechnology, IT, alternative energy, atomic power, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals.
In order to diversity away from the former predominance of heavy-industry prioritized
by Soviet era growth, the development of light industry was conceived as a means to
approximate the competitiveness of the East Asian economies. China had profited by
its ability to translate light industry into nanotechnology and other small-scale
manufacturing venues. Similarly, Kazakhstan likewise hoped to create more centers of
small-scale manufacturing to promote export-led growth from multiple centers. For
example, “Ontustyk Special Economic Zone,” scheduled for completion in 2015, aims
to rejuvenate one the few islands of light industry where Soviet Union had not neglected
regional core competencies: namely, the textile and weaving industry indigenous to
southern Central Asia.
In 2010, investment in light industry shot up from negative numbers in 2008 to 11
million. In other areas of western Kazakhstan, to offset the singular domination of the
oil industry, a project for the creation of an automated fishing complex for sturgeonfarming was initiated. In northern Kazakhstan, manufacturing facilities for potash were
implemented, while in the south phosphorus and nitrogen-phosphorus industrial zones
were targeted for development. A wide range of multiple manufacturing facilities and
commercial ventures were instituted, from rare metals extraction to tourism and
hospitality, adding to the spectrum of regional diversification across the state.
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Balancing Center and Periphery: The Challenges of Cluster Creation
However, despite the ambitious diversification program, the continued priorities of
diverting resources to the state center compromise the project of building out multiple
centers of economic productivity and business clusters. An OECD (2011) report
examining the impediments to diversified growth in Kazakhstan noted the relative
absence of sufficient infrastructure and financing to support further supply-chain
networks. The uneven distribution of resource wealth in the west, compared to
relatively resource-poor regions in the south, continues to perpetuate regional disparities
and resentments. On the one hand, poorer regions in the southern Kazakhstan rely on
the center to support and finance growth projects (Cummings, 2005). Poorer regions
feel abandoned by the increased concentration of wealth in Astana, the new center of
elite glitterati on the formerly windswept center of the steppe. At the same time, the
western regions of Kazakhstan, astride the bulk of subterranean wealth, seek to have
greater say in how regional wealth is utilized and allocated, including access to foreign
investment projects which continue invest primarily in the oil-and-gas sector.
In December 2011, deliberately coinciding with Kazakhstan’s Independence Day,
striking workers in the oil-producing western region of Mangistau led riots which
claimed 14 fatalities and over 80 injuries, as striking oil-industry workers clashed with
police over labor disputes (Rudnitsky, 2011). While the underlying origins and
outcome of the rebellion remain uncertain, the message learned by the government is
clear. Central government management of resources takes precedence over prioritizing
regional growth, if restive regional fragmentation is to be the outcome. Earlier in the
decade, government leadership accomplished the goal of establishing a symbolic
geographic center. The new capital of Astana, positioned more closely to the territorial
center of the state, reverses the peripheral place of the former capital of Almaty, as
outpost of the former Russian frontier.
Still, although Kazakhstan’s government has repositioned an illustrious new capital
closer to state center, the goal of Kazakhstan as economic epicenter of Eurasia remains
elusive. The landlocked status of the state continues to contribute to logistics and trade
difficulties that its neighbor of China, facing the Pacific, has largely overcome. No
longer at the behest of Russia, however, Kazakhstan’s political economy will look to
the maturing emerging market of China to finance internal infrastructure and engage in
mutually cooperative ventures, in order to more closely consolidate its own goal of
economic pivot of Eurasia.
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Formation of Proto-Clusters of Business and Industry in China:
From Soviet-Style Centralization to Maoist Fragmentation
In creating a policy of economic diversification and competitive economic development
that bridges state-led growth with commercial advantage, China shares with Kazakhstan
an expansive geography inflected by a Marxist-Leninist past and, previously, traditions
of state-building that emphasized control over large and often diverse regions. Here
too, policies that build up business-industrial clusters often reflect dueling legacies
where top-down priorities compete with localized, bottom-up incentives. In the case of
Kazakhstan, the lingering frontier legacy, coupled with the desire for centralized
management that previously eluded it in the Soviet era, have combined to create an
economy complicated by mixed messages to its regional governments, not to mention
the country’s populace and the global community at large. In China, divergent
institutional tendencies – namely, the tension between centralization and
decentralization – complicate a range of financial (Shih, 2009) and economic policy
choices and decisions (Zheng, 2007). The inconsistent paradigms between top-down
centralized control and bottom-up economic diversity complicate the process of
building up competitive localized clusters of business and industrial enterprise. And
these inconsistencies, in the view of Asian governments, justify strong state
interventionism, particularly where economic gaps throw off the goal of overall growth.
Recent literature of state capitalism has tended to focus on the uniform directives as
operating from a single, tightly-orchestrated center. However, in the case of
Kazakhstan, alternating currents of decentralization and centralization (Cummings,
2005) have complicated economic decision-making within the regime. In China, a
single set of quasi-authoritarian directives belies the sub-surface complexity of regional
diversity. Yet such institutional gaps may also allow for the flexibility of negotiating,
bargaining (Tsai, 2007), and creative experimentation (Pascha, et al., 2011) as low-risk
alternatives are tested out before being transposed unto larger templates of region,
province, and state (Zheng, 2007). As economic experiments involving small-scale
ventures proceed by trial and error, they impact the formation of larger-scale state
direction and directives. The evolution of competing regionalisms in China exposes
potential fragmentation but also contributes to ongoing innovations that arise out of
layering and negotiating different business and economic paradigms.
In the Chinese market, two divergent institutional legacies can be identified to impact
policies of regional economic growth and business-industrial cluster-building and
economic agglomeration. One pattern, a top-down, government led growth model
prioritizes central management of large-scale industry. This schema depends on the
concentration of state financing to target strategic industry, including centralized
support of heavy industrial manufacturing, logistics, and project finance. The other
model, a more organic patchwork of individuated micro-regions, grows out of smallscale commerce and trade. The first pattern is more prevalent in northern and western
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China, where vast territorial expanse, Soviet influence on large-scale industry, and
military-agricultural traditions of state-building prefigured top-down government
intervention. The second pattern, closely identified with southern and eastern China,
favored more individualized, small-scale commercial zones, where dense population
and diversified light industry predominated.
The centralizing legacy of China’s business-industrial development harkens back to a
previous Leninist program of state industrial policy, but also leads toward East Asian
state-development models that favor close interaction between strategic corporations
and government. By contrast, the atomistic tendency and the prioritization of local
economies, which set the stage for bottom-up business growth clusters, grew out of a
Maoist predilection for micro-regionalisms.
In the middle decades of the 20th century, for a China eager to bypass an entrenched
agrarian past and embrace large-scale industrialization, the Soviet Union represented
the apex of achievement: heavy industry, logistics, and centrally-coordinated
technology. The Soviet ability to centrally manage large territories, as well as smallscale data management (Huang, 1994) alike proved an inspiration to communist China.
By the 1950s, the Soviet Union was already creating incipient computerized systems of
input-output to collect the dizzying array of data derived from the center, as well as
multiple regional peripheries.
Further, the Soviet Union’s system of managing disparate regional entities also made its
mark on China’s emerging political economy, namely, on the Chinese frontier zone
adjacent to the Soviet border. China designated its “new frontier” (Xinjiang) as the
“Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” patterning itself after the Soviet program
naming regional Central Asian peripheries according to titular nationalities: Kazakh,
Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.s). In the former
Soviet Union, such strategies conveyed paradoxical messages of control and
concession, ultimately setting in place perimeters for eventual fragmentation into
disparate state entities. In China, while this scenario is unlikely, alternate and
coexisting trends of concession and containment continue to impact differential
economic development of business and industry along China’s western frontier.
The differential development of western vs. eastern China in the 20th century was in
part influenced by several conditions: 1) western (and northern) China’s relative
proximity to Soviet large scale industrial projects and policy zones, compared to
southeastern China’s proximity to Pacific commercial routes and Chinese diaspora
states; 2) large territorial regions of low population density, along with multi-national
populations, overlapping both Soviet Central Asia and western China; 3) shared
priorities of border control and frontier management that characterized previous
traditions of state-expansion (imperial Russia and China) and, 4) last but not least, the
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importance of subsurface assets of hydrocarbon wealth and minerals shared by both
western China and Soviet Eurasia.
Despite these shared prioritizes, by the late 1950s and 60s China’s ability to internalize
a centralized program of heavy industry, as well as the Soviet Union’s capacity to
continuously manage such projects, became formidable (Sachs and Woo, 1994). Not
only was continuous reinvestment in heavy industry costly and hard to maintain, but the
programs of centralized technology and data-management also overburdened the state
center (Huang, 1994). The Chinese state, by necessity as well as design, returned to its
own grass roots, literally and figuratively. China became increasingly preoccupied by
the far more basic concerns of food security (Meisner, 1982). Maoist campaigns
increasingly championed a return to the land: small-scale agriculture, light industry, and
radically downsized communes.
Increasingly distancing Chinese policy from Soviet-style industrial centralization, Mao
prioritized localized economies as the template for economic vitality and growth:
We cannot follow the Soviet Union, centralizing everything and leaving no way
for the localities…We need unity, but we also need particularity….[E]very
locality has to have a particularity suitable for its own conditions. Such
“particularity” is needed for the interests and the unity of the entire country
(Mao, 1977:271, 275, cited in Zheng, 1977: 360).
While in western China some state collectives retained their sprawling Soviet
dimensions (Wiemer, 2004), in eastern China downscaled communes focused on microunits of patchwork productivity. As the Chinese center was preoccupied with
maintaining its own internal administrative and fiscal organs, it increasingly ceded
management of agriculture and light industry to the regions and localities. Radical
experiments such as the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and Cultural Revolution (196676) resulted in trauma to the state and regions that went far beyond the ill-fated
experiments of the backyard furnaces.
Still, despite intermittent systemic chaos, the downscaled commune system of the 1960s
also tapped into what would prove to be a formidable advantage for eastern China: the
diversified lattice-work of village-market towns that undergirded the redefined
commune systems linking local economies to larger networks of trade (Skinner, 1963,
1964). In abandoning the large-scale Soviet models of centralized industry and vast
mechanized state firms, the Chinese economy lost the initial advantage of technological
performance. But because of this disadvantage, Chinese regional economies were able
to avail themselves of small-scale regional economies and economic decentralization
that was later to form the impetus for competitive local economies in eastern China.
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The Proliferation of Proto-Commercial Clusters in Eastern and Southern China
In eastern and southern China local economies supported differentiated micro-regions
generating a variety of business, commercial, and industrial enterprises. In the
patchwork economies of these regions, highly individuated organic growth clusters
emerged out of unique proclivities adopted to local conditions. According to Daniel
Bell, in his discussion of “What Europe Can Learn From China,” (The New York
Times, Jan. 7, 2012), local economic diversity of Europe can be compared to the
intricate China’s regional diversification, where centuries-old localities developed
specific products and markets. For instance, guilds such those of Nuremburg, based on
village market-towns, competed as centers of craftsmanship with other neighboring
German medieval and Renaissance towns. They formed regional trade networks that
became way stations along more comprehensive trade routes.
For instance, by the 1980s, the Yangzte River Delta zone and Pearl River Delta region,
supported micro- and macro-clusters that availed themselves of circuits of local industry
that dated back centuries. For instance, the origins of the Wenzhou footwear cluster in
Zhejiang province date to the fifth century A.D., while the textile and silk
manufacturing industry of Xiqiao (Guangzhou province) began in the Tang dynasty
(618-907 AD) (Zeng, 2010: 27). Eastern and southern China networks of market towns
further tapped into the trading corridors centered upon flourishing port-cities, from
Shanghai and Tianjin to Guangzhou and Hong Kong.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, specialized communes, many of them based on traditions
of regional cottage industry, created new small-scale enterprises, whether devoted to
Dragon Well Tea or plastic toothbrushes. By the early 1980s, a two-track pricing
system allowed small-scale markets to revive, as village-communes sold surplus goods
after satisfying state quotas. In order to access export-led growth, communes marketed
artisanal wares and small-scale light industrial goods at commune showrooms and
Friendship Stores. Kitten-chasing-butterfly embroidery and Great Wall carved folding
screens were test-marketed to foreign commercial vendors, primarily diaspora trade and
investment from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. Different regional
provinces from the early 1980s actively courted potential foreign investors from the
near abroad, competitively differentiating their own regional platforms. In the
concentric circles of commerce proliferating around the Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze
River Delta, and the Tianjin port zone, micro-regions, macro-urban regions and,
increasingly, Special Economic Zones facilitated a mutual spillover effect of trade and
technology that helped to create a booming economy along China’s entire eastern
seaboard.
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The Formation of Special Economic Zones, Trade Zones, and Cluster-Growth in
Eastern China
In the contemporary eastern and southeastern China of the 2000s and beyond, special
economic zones have interspersed to intensify production and innovation, creating
second- and third-generations of development based on earlier commercial clusters.
Whether designated as SEZs (special economic zones), FTZs (free trade zones), EPZs
(export-processing zones), EDTZs (economic and technological zones), or HIDZs
(high-tech industrial development zones), successive generations of competitive clusters
have drawn upon the competencies of earlier organic clusters but also competed with
them. In turn, micro-regions that did not attain special economic status have often
imitated “open cities” and established their own self-funded economic zones (Wang and
Hu, 2010).
To take advantage of spillovers, special economic zones have been established at a
partial distance from traditional urban centers, such as Guangzhou, Shanghai and
Tianjin, in order to create more extensive commercial corridors. The location of the
Shenzhen SEZ, originally a traditional fishing village, was selected by the government
for two reasons: 1) the geographic advantage of proximity to Hong Kong, as well as 2)
less resistance to institutional change (Zeng, 2010:57). Similarly, the Binhai New Area
was established at some distance to Tianjin city, the prominent 19th century port city of
northeastern China, to enhance and expand industrial and commercial opportunity into
the less-developed proximity.
The combination of bottom-up and top-down initiatives allowed local governments to
experiment with multi-stranded initiatives where lower-risk degrees of experimentation
would have lesser impact on the larger economy, in case of failure. Local
municipalities were encouraged to compete head to head, without involving the central
government. Regional and local governments were provided with hard budget
constraints, but also incentives to conduct their own economic policies and claim the
residuals (Ahrens and Jünemann, 2011; Montinola et al., 1995). Local economies
essentially acted as entrepreneurs (Oi, 1999; Zheng, 2007), with risk decentralized and
central government involvement minimized. Fine-tuned tax incentives were periodically
modified according to region, industry, maturity, and exposure to business hardship
(Zheng, 2007:156-7). Foreign investment tax rates generally capped at 15% for foreign
investors for the first few years of operation. Meanwhile, the role of local governments
in R & D varied according to industry, location and condition.
As multiple corridors of competition emerged and proliferated across eastern China,
smaller competitors were forced to find new ways to advertise and seek market share, at
times piggy-backing on their competitors. For instance, the Ningbo region utilized the
Shanghai 2010 Expo Website to remind visitors of its famous multi-industry trade fair.
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In micro-cluster and macro-cluster alike, emerging expertise encouraged other
entrepreneurial ventures – private, public, and public-private – to take risks in other
sectors and industries beyond their current domains. Multiple centers of green
technology emerging in northern and southern China have competed to differentiate
themselves, initiating relationships with regional clients, national competitors, or
international vendors.
Along China’s eastern seaboard, differential local economies have evolved to prioritize
different types of competition. In the “Wenzhou model” (southeastern Zhejiang
province), intense, small-scale competition among individual or small-scale
entrepreneurs predominates (Tsai, 2007). The mid-scale enterprises of “Sunan model”
more closely link local government with group entrepreneurship. The Pearl River
model prioritizes foreign investment as driver of competition (ibid.). Compared to the
government-driven economic models of the Chinese interior engaging the northern and
western frontier, cluster development in eastern and southeast China mobilized bottomup enterprise as the primary driver of growth.
The focus on light industry prevalent in eastern Chinese clusters, whether SEZs or
organic growth clusters, allowed for a flexible transformation that quickly adjusted to
varied degrees of small-scale experimentation. Within a single regional cluster,
diversification of local industry quickly developed into multiple, specialized niches of
export-led growth. For instance, in the Tianjian region (northeast China port zone),
original food-processing and medical equipment clusters established in the 1990s
expanded into six technology clusters by 2007: electronic information (through joint
ventures with Motorola, Panasonic, and Samsung); optical, mechanical, and electronic
integration (Honeywell); biomedicine (Novo Nordisk and Smithkline Beecham); a new
material cluster; a new energy cluster; a machinery cluster (Toyota); and an
environmental protection cluster (Veolia Water and Vestas). By 2007, Tianjin
industrial clusters supported 11 incubators, 245 incubated enterprises, 27 engineering
technology research centers, 45 R & D centers, and seven venture capital institutions.
Regional enterprises engaged in bio-chip, membrane technology, electric automobile,
stem cell, and nanometer technology research (Li et al., 2010: 94-96).
With intensified local competition within and between localized clusters of China’s
east, several degrees of expansion have gradually extended into China’s interior. In
addition to the “Big Four” first-tier cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and
Beijing), second-tier megacities have emerged along the eastern seaboard, as well as
further into central China (Chongqing, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Xian). Third-tier cities,
supporting a growing middle class, also appeared as satellites of eastern clusters (Tse,
2010). Finally, fourth-tier cities ushered the next wave of development into the western
interior, with Lanzhou (Gansu), Baotou (Inner Mongolia) and Urumqi (Xinjiang)
forming the “new wave” (ibid.).
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However, despite the gradual penetration of economic growth into the interior, the
persistent disparity of wealth between China’s east coast regions and its interior
continues to pose challenges for the Chinese government. In 2000, the Chinese central
government launched the “Develop the West” campaign, which has been followed by a
series of incentives in the following decade including land reclamation, resource
development, and educational initiatives. In China’s coastal cities, ever-intensifying
competition, along with increased costs of living and production, all mandate a push
towards the west, but one that “leapfrogs” development at a more accelerated pace.
While commercial clusters have amplified competition and led to a mature economy
along China’s eastern seaboard, China’s government is concerned that its own internal
western frontier is not keeping pace with heightened competition and commerce
elsewhere in China.

Initiating Business-Industrial Clusters on China’s Western Frontier
As China’s government addresses the development of the western frontier, it encounters
not only challenges of economic disparity, but also institutional discontinuities. In
China’s west, expansive territory, subterranean wealth, diverse populations (Han and
non-Han Chinese), and last but not least, a different institutional landscape complicates
the program of China’s state integration. Earlier state-building trajectories begun in
early imperial China, coupled with the later influence of the Soviet centralized state
industry, reinforce a policy along China’s western front that places greater emphasis on
top-down administrative-military management rather than bottom-up commercial
expansion led by localities. Further, these localities may be compromised by interests
that have little to do with the overall aims of national integration.
Beginning in the Western Han (206 BCE – 9 CE), as the tuntian system, and
culminating in the Qing Dynasty (1644 - 1912), China’s policies of border control and
frontier expansion prioritized the establishment of military containment reinforced by
agrarian settlement. China’s policy of consolidating large tracts of land across an
expansive frontier resembled imperial Russia’s policy of establishing border controls
along its own Eurasian frontier. Much as Cossacks manned military fort towns in
Siberian and Kazakh territory, in the 19th century and earlier, Han Chinese and Manchu
border guards were responsible for land reclamation and border policing along China’s
own Central Asian frontier. The goals of maintaining public order among disparate
populations, while engaging in land reclamation of less arable areas, much of it desert
and pasture, led to the prioritization of boundary controls.
The People’s Republic of China incorporated the Qing dynasty formula of frontier
border-control to contain a potentially restive frontier zone, while reclaiming arable
land for cultivation. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC),
combining agriculture settlement with policing, utilized Chinese lower-rank soldiers to
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settle the area. In contemporary western China, XPCC (bingtuan) military units took
over responsibilities of trading, in the early 2000s becoming the second largest
originator of trade and agriculture in the region after the government (Wiemer,
2004:170).
In China’s west, in contrast to the fertile east, desertification rendered arable land scarce
but valuable. In the westernmost province of Xinjiang, extensive desert expanse
bifurcates much of the region’s vast interior, despite the underlying assets of oil, gas
and minerals. In northern Xinjiang, alpine steppe zones, industry towns, and the famed
oasis town along the old northern Silk Route (Turfan) are separated by distance and
desert from former oasis towns of a more southern branch of the former Silk Route
(Kashgar and Khotan), far to the south and west of Xinjiang. Testaments to ancient
trade routes are identifiable mainly underground: cave frescoes of merchants, courtiers,
and monks of multi-ethnic origin. Still, horticulture and cotton to the south, and
livestock and dairy production in the north, in addition to hydrocarbon assets, promise
productivity in multiple industries.
Adding to the ranks of Han Chinese and former Manchu soldiers, in the mid-20th
century and the following decades, Han Chinese have migrated into the western frontier
for reasons ranging from government encouragement to new business opportunity. As
westward-bound Chinese moved into the frontier, they competed with the indigenous
Muslim Uyghur population with commercial, government and agricultural
opportunities. With the ongoing competition for jobs and a piece of the China growth
story, wealth differentials in the western regions have the potential to take on ethnic,
religious, or military complexion.
In late 2010, according to a People’s Daily article, Chinese officials admitted that
Xinjiang was still in a “fragile state” after conflicts that erupted a year later. In July
2009, official figures counted 197 people dead and 1,700 injured in one of the severest
riots in Urumqi to erupt in decades. In late February 2012, a Xinjiang-run state website
announced further tension in the region, with 20 killed and reports of local Muslims
attacking Han Chinese (Wong, 2012). The goal of lessening income gaps in order to
reduce socio-economic discord has amped up central government involvement.
Aiming to eliminate the potential “seeds of unrest” arising from income and ethnic
disparities, the central government has targeted measures that combine top-down
incentive with bottom-up localized growth. These measures are designed to accelerate
economic growth while decreasing wealth disparities in the still lagging western
regions. One of the main potential growth generators is slated to be the creation of a
special economic zone in western Xinjiang, transposing the measures of revenue
generation from China’s successful eastern development model. In 2010, the Chinese
central government took on a bold move of establishing the Kashgar SEZ, scheduled for
completion in 2016, as a regional isolate distant from other commercial or industrial
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centers closer to the Chinese center. A more likely location for cluster-creation might
have been closer to the vicinity of Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital and an urban center closer
to Beijing. The frontier boomtown of Urumqi, established as a Han administrative city,
hosts a diverse, multi-ethnic population (Han Chinese, Uyghur, Hui, Kazakh and other
nationalities), arguably more open to institutional change. By comparison, Kashgar, a
relative outpost in western Xinjiang, holds a majority Uyghur populace, with bazaars
and mosques more reminiscent of Central Asia than Han China.
In addition to the Kashgar special economic zone), micro-regional “islands” formerly
designated as ethno-nationality enclaves are now developed as economic micro-niches
for diversified industry. The Kizelesu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture and Bayangol
Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture were premised on a previous template of the Soviet
design: multi-national micro-zones, with implicit divide-and-control considerations. In
China, these ethnic-administrative territories have been repurposed as diversified
experiments of eco-niches or specialty industrials: from fruit tree cultivation and nature
preserves to mineral ore mining.
In Xinjiang, micro-regional incentives are accompanied by large-scale, integrative
development strategies. The policy of managing vast tracts of land in the western
regions is a high priority today, evidenced in capital construction and logistics projects.
According to figures from 2000, the central government dominates investment in the
capital construction projects of Xinjiang, accounting for 60% of regional investment.
This contrasts with a far lesser involvement in the rest of China, at 32% (Wiemer, 2004:
175). In 2000, the state share in the value of Xinjiang’s gross industrial output came to
77%, with the national figure of the rest of China far lower at 47% (ibid.).
A top priority of heavy industry and infrastructure projects in China’s far west is aimed
at unifying and consolidating the northern and southern parts of the vast Xinjiang
region, divided by the geography of desert expanse (Taklamakan) into bifurcated subalpine and southern oasis zones. The increased integration of the formerly fragmented
province also links up to infrastructure and logistics projects across China, with
disparate western regions connecting to networks of pipeline, rail and highway leading
to eastern China. More than eight national highways, 66 inter-provincial highways,
and more than 600 county level roads crisscross Xinjiang, with industrial efforts
ranging from energy extraction, petrochemical processing zones, saline land
reclamation projects, and other construction facilities (White Paper, Xinjiang
Development, China Daily).
Infrastructure projects linking western and eastern China also are positioned to reach far
beyond China’s western borders: to the frontier markets and emerging markets of
Eurasia, Middle East, and South Asia. As of 2009, the creation of nearly 20 Grade-I
Ports and 12 Grade-II Ports opened China’s western borderlands to a host of disparate
trading partners: Kazakhstan, Russia, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,

2012 JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS ● WWW .ICAINSTITUTE.ORG

Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2012

17

Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 4 [2012], Art. 2
DILEMMAS OF DIVERSIFICATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
BUSINESS-INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS IN CHINA AND KAZAKHSTAN

and Afghanistan. In 2008, Xinjiang’s volume of foreign trade reached 22.217 billion,
making it second in trade volume among China’s central and western provinces (ibid.).
With plans on both Xinjiang’s and Kazakhstan’s part to increase trade, in March 2012,
the Xinjiang Department of Commerce announced sales turnover between Xinjiang and
its Central Asian neighbor amounting to nearly $11 billion, up over 13% from the
previous year, with sales turnover targets in 2012 to slated to expand 18%. Meanwhile,
Kazakhstan’s Senate announced that trade turnover with China topped $20 billion in
2011 (BizXinjiang, March 29, 2012).
As China reaches beyond its western frontier into the near abroad, the future of
successful revival of overland trade -- a latter-day Silk Route -- to augment China’s
booming Pacific trade, is as yet nascent. In creating alternate trade corridors to
Eurasia, South Asia and the Middle East beyond Xinjiang, the Chinese frontier exposes
itself to a host of multi-national, economic, and institutional actors beyond its western
frontier: from long-term partners such as Pakistan and large-scale emerging markets of
India, to failed states such as Afghanistan. By opening up China’s back door to outside
influence, China will contend with divergent socio-economic and political interests that
will create opportunities, even if they complicate the state’s internal integration process.
Yet, in order to create commercial alternatives beyond the Pacific coast, China is
ultimately in a better position to create an even economic playing field for its own
internal constituents, not to mention its economic development-at-large.
By successfully building up business opportunities along its western frontier, China
more fully equipped to address the larger scope of political and economic challenges
that face it globally. Beginning with its near-neighbor Kazakhstan, China can test out
markets and investment strategies in its own backyard. Whereas Kazakhstan had been
the ambivalent recipient of Soviet industrial policy along the Russian frontier, now
China has acquired the resources to invest in large-scale industrial projects benefitting
both itself and its neighbor. The Chinese government has gradually acquired the
largesse and luxury, along with the interest, to develop infrastructure projects and heavy
industry within and beyond its own borders: namely oil, gas and commodity extraction.
China can experiment with economic, trade and investment strategies in the near abroad
(Kazakhstan) before establishing ventures further abroad (Africa and the Americas).
In the mid-20th century, the China state abandoned Soviet centralizing project of heavy
industrial investment, concentrating on developing economic diversification based on
competitive local economies. Half a century later, China has able to revisit its own
large-scale strategic industries, simultaneously amplifying investment while promoting
competition between its own corporate giants in the oil and gas industry. Having
succeeded in deploying business-industrial clusters and competitive local economies on
the eastern seaboard, it is better placed to transpose principles of economic
diversification and competitive advantage unto the state sector. At the same time,
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China is now in a better position to finance and invest in strategic projects across the
state border, in the near-west (including Kazakhstan) and further abroad.
Transposing Competitive Advantage Unto Strategic Oil and Gas Industry: From
Micro-Clusters to Multinationals
If China’s initial western development trajectory was premised to a large extent on
border containment policies and top-down industrialization, experiments in regional
competition policy successful in eastern China are being transposed both to the more
sensitive border regions, as well to high-profile strategic industries. The principles of
competitive advantage, if conditioned and generated within China’s own context, have
proved fitting vehicles for international expansion and large-scale industry. With
successful experiments of regional competition in the local economies on its own
eastern seaboard, China is better positioned to take on larger-scale projects involving
economic diversification with higher degrees of risk and reward, from natural resources
to international finance.
The central government has encouraged strategic industry giants, namely state oil-andgas multinationals, to engage in the competitive practice earlier afforded only small and
medium businesses. State oil companies, positioning themselves to be national
champions in triplicate – China National Oil (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC), and Sinopec -- have increasingly carved out separate domains.
They readily compete with one another for market share. At the same time, state
coffers are behind them, offering support in the case of downturn. Despite this,
China’s oil giants hardly resemble the stereotype of moribund monoliths passively
waiting for government handouts. Government backing does not seem to compromise
active competition among the oil giants.
As China’s three largest oil companies grew, they initially pursued strategies grounded
in territorial or functional advantage. China National Oil concentrated on upstream
extraction, while CNOOC (China Overseas Oil) focused on offshore development. Last
but not least, Sinopec devoted itself to downstream enterprises. China National Oil
initially invested in its own western frontier, Xinjiang’s Tarim basin, before expanding
further afield. CNOOC established domestic offshore localities in the East China Sea
and Bohai Bay, before extending corporate reach into overseas destinations in Southeast
Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, Sinopec established itself as the arbiter of refinery
capacity along multiple business and product lines.
Once these competencies were firmly established, these three state companies expanded
into other domains, to finally begin competing on each other’s turf. China National
Oil, after testing out its inland western frontier in Xinjiang province, went head-to-head
with China Overseas Oil (CNOOC) in a quest for international cross-border ventures
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and acquisitions. China National Oil established a beachhead in Kazakhstan, financing
an East-West pipeline to eventually link China’s western interior to the Pacific.
However, expansive strategies between competing Chinese oil giants for international
influence and oil access did not always proceed smoothly as planned. In 2005,
CNOOC, competing with China National Oil for Central Asian oil access, made moves
to acquire US-based Unocal, which presided over key oil interests in southern Central
Asia. After an outcry from US media, public, and government, the Chinese corporation
reacted quickly, pulling back its large-scale interest in US companies. In the mid-late
2000s, CNOOC quickly and quietly reversed strategic course, pursuing lower profile
deals in the US and Canada. In the long run, these acquisitions collectively comprised
great financial and territorial scope, even while attracting much less attention in the US
media. By late 2011, numerous M&A deals by CNOOC had taken multiple 33 percent
stakes in oil properties dispersed and divided up throughout the Midwestern US states.
Meanwhile, China’s neighbor Kazakhstan has become far less dependent on Russia and
the West by playing the China card for its own strategic interests. In Kazakhstan
during the early 1990s, China was seen as seen by the Kazakh populace as backwater
and country cousin, as compared to elite Russia; China was deemed a cheap purveyor of
low-quality goods and a bothersome influx of petty traders. Less than ten years later,
however, China had become a venerable and reliable source to develop Kazakhstan’s
own fragmented infrastructure. In turn, China could become a valuable ally in
providing an alternative to dependence on Russia and the West for hydrocarbon
investment. China’s ability to finance Kazakhstan’s internal infrastructure, creating
pipelines to link up Kazakhstan’s own oil-resource rich west with its populous east,
would be a future benefit. Simultaneously, China’s investment in the logistics of
Kazakhstan would also satisfy its own large appetite for oil in the process, through
linking up with China’s internal pipeline infrastructure.
More recently, China and Kazakhstan have pursued other mutually beneficial interests
as well. Both China and Kazakhstan have established sovereign wealth funds and
financial state holding companies, where diversified asset management can move
beyond faltering Western financial markets to take multiple stakes in emerging market
industries as well as those of more developed economies, whether through
commodities, international private equity, real estate, or other growth ventures. Faced
with uncertain returns in the West, China and Kazakhstan are increasingly poised to
evolve separate yet mutually cooperative investment projects to further diversify their
own state portfolios limited by the constraints of Western-dominated capital markets.
For instance, China’s financial conglomerate CITIC (China International Trust and
Investment Corporation) acquired shares of Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund
Samruk-Kazyna.
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Such projects of mutual interest will likely continue as the post-transition Asian
emerging and frontier markets outgrow their limited labels. As they balance marketdriven opportunity with state-led scenarios, they will continue to experiment with
diversified trends in capital formation, asset allocation, private equity investment, and
multi-directional trade and investment strategies that reach along varied corridors of
global reach. Along with this, both China and Kazakhstan will continue to address the
long-standing issues of diversification in their own interiors, as they negotiate the
delicate balancing act between central and local, state and market.
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